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Music as Biotech: Remixing the
UBMTA for Use with Digital Samples
by Adam G. Holofcener1
Duke University School of Law professor
James Boyle wrote, “If one had to represent the image of creativity around which copyright law and
patent law, respectively, are built, patent law’s model
of creativity would be a pyramid and copyright law’s
a fountain, or even an explosion.”2 This Article asks
“Why?” and “Can copyright law, specifically in the area
of licensing digital music samples, learn anything from
patent law?” This Article will explore: how the Biotech
community has learned to share patented materials
easily and equitably through the Uniform Biological
Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA);3 how development of the doctrine of Experimental Use allows for
beneficial unlicensed use of patented materials;4 how
the traditional copyright licensing structure does not
work for digital music samples;5 how Fair Use does not,
at least at the moment, lend itself to obviate the need
for a restructuring of the copyright licensing system;6
why copyright needs the benefit of liberal borrowing
techniques like those patent licensing enjoys from the
UBMTA;7 and how copyright law can, and already has,
started to model itself off of variations on patent licensing model agreements.8 Creativity, in the realm of both
patents and copyrights, may not be that different.
The UBMTA is the right model for this
specific type of copyright reform because the
underlying sentiments of scientific research and music
made with digital samples are the same. A large part of
research is conducted for non-commercial purposes, for
the joy of exploration. Similarly, a majority of music is
created without concern for commercial gain, solely for
the sake of sonic exploration. The UBMTA encourages
1

1. Adam G. Holofcener: University of Maryland School of
Law, J.D. (2012). Thanks to those in the intellectual property
department at Maryland Law, Future of Music Coalition, and
Maryland Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts for making the law fun. I
also have to thank my family, friends, and Baltimore.
Adam.Holofcener.Law@gmail.com - http://www.kunstemporary.
com.
2. James Boyle, The Public Domain 123-24 (2008).
3. See Part I(A), infra.
4. See Part I(B), infra.
5. See Part II(A), infra.
6. See Part II(B), infra.
7. See Part III(A), infra.
8. See Part III(B), infra.
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creation engendered by humanity’s insatiable curiosity.
And the UBMTA does not stop there. The commercial
possibilities surrounding both scientific research and
music production are too lucrative to be ignored. The
UBMTA creates pathways for scientists and institutions
conducting non-commercial uses to go commercial
with little friction and compensation for all parties
involved. A similar structure would benefit everyone
participating in music production, from the bedroom
composer to the major record label. Humans should be
allowed to mess around with the world around them,
in both the contexts of organic material and media. The
UBMTA properly lays out the parameters for sharing
all intellectual property in both non-commercial and
commercial transactions.
I.

Transferring Patented Materials Between
Members of the Biotech Community for
Non-Commercial and Commercial Use

Through the UBMTA, the members of
the Biotech community have a method of using
each others’ patented material for non-commercial
means without much cost, and sometimes none at
all. These non-commercial uses can then be turned
into commercial uses. This section of the paper will
first examine the UBMTA as a successful vehicle for
freely, or cheaply, licensing patented materials for noncommercial research purposes while allowing for the
fruits of the research to be used for later commercial
purposes. Second, this section will analyze the
development of the doctrine of Experimental Use.
A. The UBMTA
Generally, a Material Transfer Agreement
(MTA) is “a . . . contract between the owner of a . .
. material and a party [seeking] the material . . . for
research purposes.”9 As the National Institute of
Health (NIH) points out:
MTAs are important because they require the recipient
to exercise care in the handling of the materials, to
maintain control over the distribution of the materials,
9. Nat’l Inst. of Health , Report of the National Institute
Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools, app. B
(1998) [hereinafter Research Tools Report], available at http://
biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/NIH/researchtools/Report98.htm.
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to acknowledge the provider in publications, and to
follow relevant [Public Health Service] guidelines
relating to recombinant DNA, protection of human
subjects in research, and the use of animals.10
However, MTAs are not all consistent; a
model MTA, such as the UBMTA, is helpful for
transferring patented materials while making sure that
the principles above are applied uniformly.11 Exploring
the history of the UBMTA will help us to understand
the niceties of the actual agreement and its reasons for
possible success.
1. History of the UBMTA
In 1988, the Public Health Service (PHS)
issued their “Policy Relating to Distribution of Unique
Research Resources Produced with [Public Health
Service] Funding,” acknowledging problems that befell
PHS and NIH scientists with MTAs that required caseby-case negotiations.12 In 1989, the NIH, in response
to the PHS’s “Policy,” released a model MTA to be used
by PHS scientists; however, this model MTA did not
extend to other organizations.13 The UBMTA grew out
of this tradition.14 The NIH proposed the UBMTA
in 1994, in conjunction with members of academia15
and industry, “to address concerns about contractual
obligations imposed by some [material transfer
agreements] and to simplify the process of sharing
proprietary materials between non-profit institutions.”16
Specifically, the UBMTA cut down on transaction
costs associated with the transfer of biological materials
and streamlined the process so that a transfer could
take place with only an implementing letter and
a statement, signed by the Provider and Recipient
scientists, acknowledging that the agreement was in

10. Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement:
Discussion of Public Comments Received; Publication of the Final
Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,771, 12,771 (Mar. 8,
1995) [hereinafter UBMTA].
11. Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st
Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property
and Antitrust Law 286 (2009).
12. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv. NIH Guide
For Grants and Contracts, Vol. 17, No. 29, September 16,
1988: pg. 1.
13. UBMTA: Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,000
(Jun. 21, 1994).
14. Id.
15. Members of the Association of University Technology
Managers (“AUTM”), Ms. Joyce Brinton, Harvard University; Ms.
Lita Nelsen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. Sandra
Shotwell, Oregon Health Sciences University.
16. UBMTA: Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,000
(Jun. 21, 1994).

accordance with the UBMTA.17 In 1995, the NIH
issued a final version of the UBMTA after reviewing
public comments on the 1994 proposal.18
The public comments addressed two areas of
the UBMTA that the NIH ended up revising from
the original version.19 First, the provision mandating
that the Provider of the material furnish the Recipient
with information regarding the patent status of the
materials was removed for fear that the Recipient may
inadvertently harm the Provider’s chance of successfully
obtaining a patent for the material.20 Second, the NIH
added a provision that obliged institutions to provide a
legally binding signatory to UBMTA material transfers
if the scientist signing the agreement is not legally
authorized to bind the institution.21
The PHS recommended that the UBMTA be
adopted “for general use in the exchange of materials
for research purposes among public and non-profit
organizations,” but for-profit organizations were not
precluded from using the document.22 The PHS
acknowledged that the UBMTA may not be sufficient
for every material transfer, however, it was believed that
the desired benefits of this model agreement would
come to fruition even if the UBMTA was only used in
the majority of transfers.23 Those institutions who have
signed onto the UBMTA, a list of now over 400, can
be found on the Association of University Technology
Managers website.24 In 2008, the NIH released
a Research Tools Report which reemphasized the
importance of the UBMTA and some constraints the
document itself may have, in both its current format
and usage.25
2. Provisions of the UBMTA
For the purposes of this paper, the UBMTA
contains two parts: the implementing letter and the
17. Id.
18. UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,771.
19. Id. (making other small changes to the original proposal
such as refining the definitions of “modification” and “non-profit
organization,” and adding a definition for “commercial Purposes”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Association of University Technology Managers,
Signatories to the March 8, 1995 Master UBMTA Agreement, http://
www.autm.net/Technology_Transfer_Resources/7150.htm.
25. Research Tools Report, supra note 9, at
“Recommendations.” For the purposes of this paper, the UBMTA’s
inadequate implementation will not be relevant because the focus
here is on theoretical differences between patent and copyright
licensing, not the problems of implementation which surround any
policy once it is put into use.
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actual agreement.26 A material transfer can take place
when an implementing letter is signed by both the
Provider27 and Recipient28 scientists, and, if need
be, by someone at the Recipient institution with
legally binding authority, if the scientist attached
to the agreement does not have such authority.29
The implementing letter includes information on
the Provider and Recipient institutions, the original
material being transferred, being transferred, a
possible termination date and a transmittal fee, if the
Provider incurred any preparation or distribution costs
in the material transfer.30 The implementing letter
acknowledges that both parties to the agreement have
signed an unmodified copy of the UBMTA and agree
to be bound by its terms.31 Michael Carrier, in his book
Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power
of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, lists the
eight fundamental provisions to the UBMTA; we will
explore each provision in turn.32
First, the UBMTA stipulates that the Provider
owns the Material.33 This clause also states that the
Provider retains ownership of any Material contained or
incorporated in Modifications.34 Second, the Recipient
retains ownership of (1) Modifications, except for the
Material still included in said Modifications, and (2)
substances created through the use of the Material
or Modifications, but which are NOT Progeny,
Unmodified Derivatives, or Modifications.35 These
first two provisions are important because they set up
26. UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,771. In the UBMTA
framework there is also a “simple letter agreement for transfer of
non-proprietary biological material,” however, our analysis can
take place without dissecting this document, which shares essential
qualities with the rest of the UBMTA materials.
27. Id. at 11,773. The UBMTA defines a “Provider” as an
organization providing the Original Material.
28. Id. The UBMTA defines a “Recipient” as an organization
receiving the Original Material.
29. Id. at 12,771.
30. UBMTA at 12,773, 12,775. The UBMTA defines
“Original Material” as the material described for transfer in the
implementing letter.
31. UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,772.
32. Carrier, supra note 11, at 286.
33. UBMTA, 60 Fed Reg. at 12,773 (defining “Material”
as Original Material, Progeny, and Unmodified Derivatives,
not including Modifications and/or other substances created
by the Recipient through the use of the Material which are not
Modifications, Progeny or Unmodified Derivatives).
34. Id. at 12,773 (defining “Modifications” as substances
created by the Recipient which contain or incorporate the
Material.).
35. Id. (“[those] substances created through the use of the
Material or Modifications, but which are not Progeny, Unmodified
Derivatives or Modifications (i.e. do not contain the Original
Material, Progeny or Unmodified Derivatives”)).
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a clear and equitable ownership structure surrounding
the Material and its byproducts that is in line with proresearch principles.
The first two provisions of the UBMTA
make sense when supported by the third and fourth
fundamental provisions: that the Material will be used
“solely for teaching and academic research purposes,”36
and “the Provider shall have no obligation to grant
such a [commercial] license to the Recipient . . . .”37
For some, these two provisions are seen to hinder
the UBMTA because they anchor the UBMTA
in non-commercial use and encourage university
technology transfer officials “to depart from the
[UBMTA] whenever they think a particular material
may have commercial value.”38 However, my belief
is that these provisions, and even deviation from the
UBMTA itself in some cases, are not a bad thing.
To borrow some language from the Supreme Court
and the jurisprudence of copyright, which itself was
borrowed from 18th century english literature, “[n]o
man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”39
The utilization of this quote shows, or at the very
least suggests, that creation is inextricably linked to
commerce. Therefore, even if the UBMTA itself does
not deal with the logistics of material transfers in the
commercial world, it creates an environment ripe for
commercial opportunities because increased research
activities increase the propensity for commercially
viable material, which may further streamline
commercial material transfers as well as others. The
PHS and NIH support this view with language in
the Federal Register: “any organization would retain
the option to handle specific material with unusual
commercial or research value on a customized basis.”40
The UBMTA is not a catchall, but as was mentioned
earlier, the largest difficulty has been its lack of a unified
implementation, this does not necessarily denigrate
the potentially successful theoretical underpinning of
the document though. The fifth fundamental principle
of the UBMTA supports this view even further:
the Recipient can file patent applications claiming
inventions it made through use of the Material.41 The
UBMTA is trying to encourage an environment where
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12,774.
38. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289,
306 (2003).
39. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584
(1994) (quoting 3 Boswell’s Life of Johnson 19 (1934)).
40. UBMTA, 60 Fed Reg. at 12,771-12,772.
41. Id. at 12,774.
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unencumbered research can lead to situations that
promote licensing opportunities that would not have
existed without the principles laid out in the UBMTA.
The sixth fundamental principle of the
UBMTA is that the Recipient will be liable for damages
that spawn from the Material.42 This provision further
entices institutions to share resources by letting
Providers be free of responsibility relating to their
Material, even though they still own the Material.
The seventh principle is that the “[UBMTA] shall
not be interpreted to prevent or delay publication
of research findings resulting from the use of the
Material or Modifications.”43 Like the second and
third principles, the importance the UBMTA puts
on dissemination of knowledge through publication
further demonstrates that this document is pro-research
and pro-creativity. The eighth and final principle of
the UBMTA underscores the prior efforts of the NIH
and PHS in developing this document: the Material is
to be transferred for free, excepting any preparation or
distribution costs.44 In essence, the UBMTA proclaims
that the tools of research should be available for
scientists to tinker with for the good of humanity, with
the tacit understanding that the dissemination of these
tools can only have positive fiscal implications flow
from an increase in non-commercial activity.
B. The Doctrine of Experimental Use
The development of Experimental Use by the
courts has allowed for the unlicensed use of patented
materials in certain situations. This section of the
paper will explore the growth of Experimental Use as
a doctrine and where the contours of the defense lie
today.
1. Development of the Defense of
Experimental Use
Justice Story first considered the idea of
Experimental Use in the case of Whittemore v.
Cutter.45 Justice Story stated that the intent of patent
legislation was not to punish an individual who created
a patented machine purely for her own “philosophical
experiments.”46 Shortly after Whittemore, Justice Story
had the opportunity to refine his first musings on
the subject of Experimental Use in Sawin v. Guild.47
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (D. Mass. 1813).
46. Id. at 1121. See also Matthew Rimmer, Intellectual
Property and Biotechnology 164 (2008).
47. 21 F. Cas. 554 (D. Mass. 1813).

Justice Story explained that “the making of [a] patented
machine to be an offence [sic] within the purview of it,
must be the making with intent to use for profit, and
not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment,
or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
specification. In other words, the making must be with
an intent to infringe the patent right and deprive the
owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.”48 Justice
Story’s holding in Sawin was reiterated in the 1861 case
of Poppenhausen v. Falke.49
In his book, Intellectual Property and
Biotechnology, Matthew Rimmer likened the
early iteration of Experimental Use to something
used by natural philosophers such as Henry David
Thoreau.50 Rimmer explains that Experimental Use
left its roots in mechanical inventions and adapted for
industries as diverse as agriculture, biotechnology and
pharmaceutical drugs.51 In recent years, the doctrine
of Experimental Use was narrowed by the courts,
especially because the doctrine is yet to be codified into
law.52
Experimental Use was first narrowed in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., Inc.53 In
Roche, a pharmaceutical drug patent owned by Roche
Products was about to expire and Bolar Pharmaceutical,
in preparing its application for a generic version of
Roche’s drug to the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), used Roche’s still patented
drug in testing.54 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit found that Experimental Use did not
apply in this context and that Bolar was liable for
infringement.55 The United States Congress responded
to Roche by enacting the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Hatch-Waxman
Act) which created an exception in section 271(e)(1)
of the Patent Act.56 The exception granted that “it shall
not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
48. Id. at 555.
49. Poppenhausan v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (“It has been held, and no doubt is now
well settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole
purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere
amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”).
50. Rimmer, supra note 46, at 164.
51. Id. at 165.
52. Id.
53. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Rimmer, supra note 46, at 174.
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reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.”57
Experimental Use was recently narrowed
by the Federal Circuit decision in Madey v. Duke
University.58 In Madey, Duke used lasers that were
patented by a scientist, Madey, who used to be on staff
at the University.59 After Madey’s departure, Duke
continued to use the patented lasers, so Madey brought
suit against the University for patent infringement.60
The Federal Circuit found in favor of Madey and
determined that the non-profit status of an institution
is of no concern in an Experimental Use analysis.
The correct focus is on “whether or not the use was
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry.”61 The Supreme Court
did not grant Duke’s petition for certiorari, and Duke
eventually settled with Madey, however, after Madey,
the status of Experimental Use for research universities
is now quite unclear.62 The Supreme Court in Merck
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., most recently
upheld the exception in 271(e)(1) of the Patent Act.63
II. The Transfer of Copyrighted Music Material
for Use in Derivative and Appropriation
Based Works
The Music Industry deals with the transfer
and use of its copyrighted material in a very different
way than the Biotech community treats its patented
materials. Before we analyze whether the two
institutions have any reason to approach their materials
similarly, especially considering that copyright and
patent encompass two different legal disciplines, we
must examine where copyright licensing falls short
in its treatment of contemporary works that rely on
copyrighted source material for its chosen means of
expression. Examples abound of musical works that
utilize digital samples. The premiere genre of music to
57. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
58. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1363.
62. Rimmer, supra note 46, at 164.
63. 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (stating a four part holding by
Justice Scalia: (1) the 271(e)(1) exception should be read broadly;
(2) the exception is not limited to only preclinical data pertaining
to safety of drug in humans; (3) the exception can extend to
experimentation on drugs that do not ultimately appear in an
application before the FDA; and (4) the exception can extend to the
use of patented compounds in experiments that do not culminate
with submission to the FDA).
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integrate sampling into our social fabric has been hiphop. Artists such as Vanilla Ice, Public Enemy, 2 Live
Crew, the Beastie Boys, and Biz Markie helped develop
the genre both musically, and litigiously, by their use
of digital samples.64 However, hip-hop is not the only,
nor even the first, musical genre to utilize samples.65
This section mimics the structure of Section I above
and contains a study of traditional music licensing,
desperately in want of a model agreement like the
UBMTA, and the Doctrine of Fair Use, copyright’s
answer to Experimental Use.
A. Traditional Music Licensing and Digital Samples
A digital sample of music consists of a
sound, or group of sounds, recorded on a digital
medium66 that can be easily copied, manipulated, and
repurposed to create new musical objects.67 In a digital
sample of music, there are two relevant copyrights:
(1) the underlying musical composition and (2) the
performance of that musical composition which resides
on the sound recording; in licensing a digital sample,
each copyright is usually handled by a separate licensing
agreement.68 Under the Copyright Act of 1976, it is
64. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Newton v. Diamond,
349 F.3d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2003); Grand Upright v. Warner,
780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The aforementioned artists
used samples which contained the copyrighted materials of others,
but from those samples crafted extremely creative, and lucrative,
popular music.
65. Sampling also has a rich tradition in academia and
high art. From Musique Concrète, developed in France in the
early 1900s, to works by John Cage and Steve Reich, made in the
United States during the latter part of the 20th Century, we now
have a wide swath of artists, such as Negativland, the Books, the
Avalanches, Four Tet, Girl Talk, Jason Urick and Cex, who blur the
lines between hip-hop, art music, formal graduate level dissertations
and beyond. Currently, the type of individuals who create sample
based music range from amateurs posting exclusively on the internet
to professional recording artists and everywhere in between.
66. See Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever 192-195
(2009). Digital recording devices translate recorded sound waves
into binary code (0s and 1s), to be reassembled later by a digital
playback machine, as opposed to analog recordings that transcribe
the actual recorded sound waves onto what is usually magnetic tape
or wax.
67. See Peter DiCola & Kembrew McLeod, Creative
License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling 37-42
(2011). Sampling had taken place before digital technology;
however, the current deluge of works utilizing samples was of no
moment before because creating, using or reproducing samples in
the analog world involved expensive equipment and expertise. Now,
almost every commercially sold computer comes with software
that allows you to easily, and intuitively, manipulate digital music
files. Further, in the analog world, the distribution of music was
also cumbersome and expensive, leading to even fewer individuals
distributing their sample based works than those actually creating
them.
68. Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 30.03
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the exclusive right of the copyright owner to create
derivative works; a license is necessary if an individual
wants to create a derivative work by using a digital
sample of a copyrighted music sound recording.69
Copyright licensing agreements, which operate as
contracts, allow for an infinite number of variations
to fit the needs of the individual transaction; however,
copyright law does necessitate that certain provisions be
explicit and in writing to be enforceable.70 This section
will explore copyright licensing agreements in the
abstract before exploring how these agreements operate
in reality.
1. Copyright Licensing Agreements
In his treatise on licensing, Robert Milgrim
included a sample copyright license agreement, the
grant of which is worth inspection.71 In Milgrim’s
sample license, the licensor grants the licensee a nonexclusive right to copy, prepare derivative works,
and distribute the licensed work in a specified
geographic region for a royalty based on the net sales
of the licensed work.72 In one of only two footnotes
accompanying the sample license, Milgram says, “[T]
he need to prepare derivative works is important
for certain types of copyright license, particularly
those pertinent to the subject matter of this treatise.
This right permits the licensee to use the licensed
work as a ‘base’ from which, with modifications,
(stating the underlying musical composition is the arrangement of
musical notes that underlie the musical piece). Originally, musical
compositions were fixed in sheet music, or player piano rolls, and
protection extended to the reproduction of the arrangement of
musical notes as well as their public performance. In 1971, sound
recordings were deemed copyrightable. The sound recording holds a
copyright on the arrangement of said notes residing on a particular
phonorecord. The sound recording can now also be used to fix the
musical composition. Therefore, in a digital sample both copyrights
are implicated because an exact copy of the phonorecord is digitally
created when an individual appropriates a chunk of another
individual’s song via the splicing of binary code, and that digital
copy contains the musical composition which has been fixed by the
sound recording.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (informing that other rights are also
implicated with digital samples, such as the performance right
or distribution right, but those other rights would probably be
involved in the negotiation of the right to make derivative works).
70. Van Lindberg, Intellectual Property and Open
Source: A Practical Guide to Protecting Code 150 (2008).
71. Milgrim on Licensing 4-IV FORM IVC (listing
standard terms referring to: the negation of rights not licensed,
duration of the license, audit rights, licensor’s warranties, no grants
of other rights, indemnification, assignment, breach and governing
law. As we will see below, the importance of our discussion on
traditional copyright licenses is not necessarily the wording of the
agreements themselves but how those agreements are obtained and
the consideration that usually accompanies those agreements.)
72. Id.

to create a derivative work.”73 Although, Milgrim
specifically mentions software, not music, in reference
to the importance of derivative works creation in the
footnote,74 it is the omission of derivative musical
works, specifically made from digital samples, which
perpetuates the absence of a proper licensing scheme
for the discipline.
In Nimmer’s seminal treatise on copyright,
we find an omission similar to that of Milgrim.75
While Nimmer includes sample agreements that
handle the original sale of copyrights in musical
compositions and sound recordings at their creation
and sample agreements that handle musical licenses
for motion picture, television, and stage shows
there is no advice on how to wade the treacherous
licensing waters in regards to digital sampling.76 Even
more telling are the provisions of Nimmer where
digital sampling is mentioned. In a footnote from
the chapter on “Assignments, Licenses, and Other
Transfers of Rights,” Nimmer briefly mentions digital
sampling to demonstrate that past grants of copyright,
which include the contractual language “all rights of
whatsoever nature,” implicate digital sampling.77 This
one line of insight on previously constructed copyright
licenses provides little guidance for future agreements,
which have been adjusted to such a development.
Nimmer mentions digital sampling again in a footnote
in his chapter on “Performance,” which posits that
compulsory licensing in “an era of . . . digital sampling”
may be successfully adapted to other areas of music.78
Digital sampling is most prevalent in Nimmer’s chapter
on “Infringement;” this paper’s section on Fair Use will
speak to that.79
2. The “How?” and “How Much?” of Digital
Sample Licensing Agreements
In the abstract, licensing digital samples may
seem like a reasonable contractual endeavor, especially
when a musician at a major record label has a legal
department and financial resources to clear rights
73. Id. at n. 1 (emphasis added) (borrowing of “modifications”
helps to underscore the assumption of this paper, that creation,
whether it be technical or sonic, happens through the use of
previously created materials and our licensing agreements should
encourage such creation.)
74. Id.
75. Nimmer, supra note 68, § 30.03.
76. Id. at §§ 30.02-30.06.
77. Id. at § 10.10 n. 1; see also Batiste v. Island Records Inc.,
179 F.3d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1999).
78. Nimmer, supra note 68, § 8.17 n. 6; see also 17 U.S.C §
116.
79. Nimmer, supra note 68, § 13.03.
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for digital samples. Without the benefits of a major
record label, the logistical and financial requirements
of obtaining a license may prove insurmountable.
First, in order to obtain a license, you have to know
who owns the copyrighted material. There are no
longer formal requirements for obtaining copyright
protection and, thus, while it may still be possible to
locate the owners of very well-known copyrighted
works from the twentieth century our current databases
are insufficient when it comes to works outside of that
scope.80 This is especially true for lesser known works
which may be more amenable to offering a reasonably
priced license.81 With so little information publically
available, a savvy would-be licensee probably need to
obtain counsel to conduct a search. The search for the
copyright owners, because there may be, and usually
are, different owners for the respective composition and
sound recording copyrights, in the hands of an attorney
will be expensive, especially when the piece sought for
licensing may be an orphan work whose owners are in
fact be impossible to find.82
In Free Culture, Lawrence Lessig presents
the example of Jon Else, a documentary filmmaker
who unsuccessfully attempted to seek permission for
a clip from an episode of The Simpsons to appear for
4.5 seconds in the background of his film to show
how difficult it can be to wade through the licensing
waters.83 Else first contacted the office of Simpsons’
creator Matt Groening to seek permission for use of the
clip.84 Groening gave Else permission, but he suggested
that Else check with the company that produces The
Simpsons, Gracie Films.85 Else then received permission
from Gracie Films, who subsequently asked Else to
contact Fox, Gracie Film’s parent company.86 Fox told
Else two things: that Groening does not own the rights
to The Simpsons, and that it would cost $10,000
to use the 4.5 second clip of the Simpsons in his

80. Brianna Dahlberg, The Orphan Works Problem: Preserving
Access To The Cultural History of Disadvantaged Groups, 20 S. Cal.
Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 275, 289 (2011).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 281 (stating that difficulties in locating copyright
owners can be attributed to extended terms of copyright, taking
foreign works out of the public domain, and the change in our
policies concerning formal registration).
83. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 96 (2004) (claiming
it can be assumed that the process of obtaining a license would be
the same whether or not you were trying to clear a video or music
sample).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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documentary.87 $10,000 was far above the budget of a
documentary filmmaker like Else, so he had to digitally
replace the Simpsons clip with footage he had taken
for a previous film.88 This example shows the licensing
trials and tribulations of one reasonably successful
documentary filmmaker. We will return to the progress
in licensing forged by documentary filmmakers in our
discussion of Fair Use, but now we will look directly at
the startling costs that can accompany licensing digital
samples in music.
Jay L. Berger, agent and business manager of
a musical group entitled “The Cold Crush Brothers,”
submitted expert testimony on licensing in the case
The Cold Crush Brothers v. Columbia Recording
Corp.89 Berger explained that a typical license fee for
a sound recording would be between $0.05 and $0.08
per unit and for a musical composition90 would be
from $0.03775 to $0.0755 per unit.91 These prices are
extremely small by themselves, but Berger explained,
“[i]n negotiating a contract for a license, customarily
he would demand a non-refundable advance based
on either 500,000 or 1,000,000 units, as an initial
payment.”92 Assuming that Berger would have asked
for an advance on 1,000,000 units, the total sound
recording and musical composition licenses would
cost between $87,750 and $155,500.93 The court
found that Berger’s calculations were reasonable.94
These “reasonable” costs are prohibitively expensive
for amateur and even most professional creators who
are interested in making music that utilizes digital
samples.95 With proper licensing as an untenable
87. Id. To provide context, Else’s documentary was on
Wagner’s Ring Cycle, and the fleeting shot of the Simpsons came at
the bottom corner of the screen when Else took footage of stage
hands on a break playing checkers and watching TV.
88. Id. at 97.
89. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84729 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (stating
that Berger “reviewed and/or negotiated more than three hundred
songwriter contracts and master license use and sample use
agreements for master recordings and compositions”).
90. The license fee for a musical composition is usually
determined by statute. See 37 C.F.R § 255.3.
91. The Cold Crush Brothers v. Columbia Recording Corp.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84729, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (basing
figures on a “per-unit sold” basis).
92. Id.
93. Id. at *13 (holding that Berger did, in fact, ask for this
number and it was found reasonable, but the higher number was
chosen specifically in reference to the copyright infringement
involved in the case; however, even if the minimum advance was
chosen by Berger, it would not make the licensing cost any less
prohibitively expensive for the majority of musicians).
94. Id.
95. Lessig, supra note 83, at 96 (pointing out that Public
Enemy’s manager will no longer “allow” them to sample because
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solution to creating works with digital samples, artists
only viable option is to hope that their work qualifies
under the doctrine of Fair Use.
B. Why Fair Use Does Not Work for Creating
Derivative Works with Digital Samples
Codified in the Copyright Act of 1976,
Fair Use allows for the “use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”96
Fair Use is an affirmative defense that can be brought
by an individual with an infringement claim against
them.97 In determining whether the purported infringer
has a successful claim of Fair Use, the court must
consider the following four factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market98 for or
value of the copyrighted work.99 The Fair Use analysis
is conducted by the court on a case-by-case basis, with
each factor given more, or less, weight depending on
the context.100 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
the Supreme Court stated that “the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.”101 With no bright line test for Fair
Use, it can be a highly unpredictable defense to use
with hardly consistent results.
We are concerned with how the courts have
dealt with Fair Use in the context of copyrighted
music compositions and sound recordings. To apply
the doctrine of Fair Use it is first necessary to find
the legal costs are too high); see Willful Infringement: A Report
from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars (Fiat Lucre
Productions 2003).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97. Id.
98. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (1994) (holding that the
consideration of the effect upon the potential market extends not
only to the copyrighted work, but to derivative works as well).
99. Id.
100. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
101. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (CCD Mass. 1841) (“[I]t is as clear, that if
he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a view,
not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and
substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a
piracy.”).

infringement. Usually, Fair Use has been relegated
to the realm of parody and news reporting, however,
music made with digital samples more naturally
falls under the headings of critique or comment.102
Therefore, because the case law is undeveloped in
the arena of Fair Use and digital samples, it will be
necessary to focus our study on the concept of de
minimis use, which has played a more substantial part
in showing musicians and lawyers how and when they
may use digital samples.
1. De Minimis and Fair Use
In Newton v. Diamond, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed
whether a six second, three note digital sample
infringed the composition copyright of a piece of
music.103 In analyzing the sample, the court applied
the theory of de minimis copying, which allows for
some copying as long as an average listener would
not recognize the use of the original composition.104
The court conducted its analysis under the framework
laid out by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, just
as the Supreme Court did in Campbell.105 The
court concluded that the use of the sample was not
of any quantitative or qualitative significance and
was therefore de minimis.106 Newton allows for the
possibility that a composition copyright in a digital
sample can be used without obtaining a license; the
same cannot be said for the sound recording copyright
though.
In Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
examined whether another use of a three note digital
sample was considered de minimis, however, this
time the examination implicated the sound recording
copyright.107 The court fashioned a bright line
rule unlike any that has been seen in the Fair Use/
de minimis jurisprudence: “Get a license or do not
sample.”108 The court, after delivering its ruling, stated
102. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Harper 471 U.S.
at 560.
103. Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir.
2003) (the defendants in this case had properly licensed the sound
recording copyright for use in their derivative work; therefore, the
Court’s analysis only concerned the composition copyright).
104. Id. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir.
1986).
105. Newton, 349 F.3d at 596-97.
106. Id. at 598.
107. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
108. Id. at 801 (being somewhat similar to Judge Duffy’s
opening remark of Grant Upright v. Warner, 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Thou shalt not steal.”)).
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that it did not see this test as one that would stifle
creativity because a musician could mimic the sound
of the recording by playing the instruments himself
or, if he felt so inclined to sample, the market would
keep the price of samples reasonable.109 In perhaps
even less justified musings, the court explained that
many musicians and record labels have chosen to
license, implying that this has become a reasonable
practice for all.110 Of course, the court found that
summary judgment in favor of Dimension Films was
inappropriate and remanded the case to the district
court.111 However, the court did say that on remand
the district court was free to hear arguments on Fair
Use.112 It is substantially dubious that the district
court could have been able to find Fair Use after the
“get a license or do not sample” maxim. Fair Use is
wildly unpredictable; therefore, the music and legal
communities are left only to wonder whether they
should test the bounds of the Sixth Circuit’s axiom or
just obtain an expensive license.
III. The Music Industry through the Creative
Lens of the Biotech Community
The music industry could benefit from the
implementation of systemic changes which mimic
the Biotech community’s support for research and
experimentation. The first part of this section will
explore the first major roadblock presented by this
proposal: why should the creation of music with digital
samples be sublimated to a similar plane as scientific
research done at the university level? Second, this
section will examine how the music industry could
create a model agreement such as the UBMTA to easily
license digital samples.
A. Why is an Easy and Equitable Licensing Scheme
for Digital Samples Important, or at Least
Worthy of UBMTA like Treatment?
Apart from being born out of Article I, § 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, copyright
and patent do not share many practical similarities.
However, that one common thread should not be
overlooked and can be used to buttress this argument:
our founding fathers were interested in the progress of
both the arts and sciences, even if, semantically, those
109. Id. (demonstrating that as seen in the discussion of The
Cold Crush Brothers, the cost of licenses for digital samples is not
reasonable).
110. Id. at 804.
111. Id. at 805.
112. Id.
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two terms played different roles at the drafting of the
Constitution. Art and science are not analogous in the
micro sense, but from the macro perspective of creative
based endeavors in western civilization, similarities are
apparent. The comparisons become even clearer when a
public/private duality underlies the information used in
both creative fields. Sound and Biotech, as egalitarian
members of the IP brotherhood and disciplines that
both bear most of their fruit from new things made
out of old things, equally deserve to have their progress
promoted as Article I, § 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution
intended.
1. How Incompatible is Western
Civilization’s Creative Process with
Current Licensing Schemes?
Two examples, one antiquated and one
contemporary, best illustrate some misconceptions
of the average IP lawyer, or citizen for that matter,
about how music creation actually occurs. In his book,
Music and Copyright, Ronald Rosen presented the
story of Antonio Lucio Vivaldi and Johann Sebastian
Bach, two titans of western classical music.113 In 1712,
Vivaldi composed a Concerto for Four Violins; in 1730,
Bach composed a Concerto for Four Harpsichords.114
Other than being arranged for different instruments
and being in different keys, the pieces are exactly the
same.115 Rosen postulated that Vivaldi would have
never brought suit against Bach, even though he had
an open and shut case of infringement, for two reasons:
“(1) there was no concept of copyright protection in
Germany and Italy (the obvious venues for legal action)
nor were there any copyright laws in those “countries”
in the 18th century; and (2) until the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries in Italy and Germany, the
concept that anyone could “own” literary, musical or
other artistic creations was not contemplated.”116 So,
the first reason that licensing would be incompatible
with the tradition of Western music creation is that the
musicians themselves, until somewhat recently, would
113. Ronald Rosen, Music and Copyright 4 (2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.; see Norman Carrell, Bach the Borrower 241
(1967). This was not an isolated case; Bach liberally borrowed from
a host of other composers such as Corelli, Albinoni, Benedetto
Marcello, Torelli, Telemann, Neumark, Rosenmüeller, Buxtehude
and others. And Bach was not the only person to participate in this
common practice. George Frideric Handel shared Bach’s proclivity
for borrowing and building on the music of his contemporaries.
116. Rosen, supra note 113, at 5 (“[T]his is most certainly
the tradition that we descended from musically, as well as legally,
because, remember, our first copyright statute of 1790 granted only
protection to books, maps and charts, not music.”).
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have thought the proposition itself absurd. However,
in our next example we find out what happens when
the buck stops being passed and a musician from the
“borrowing” heritage accepts payment for a license of
his musical composition.
James Boyle, in his book The Public Domain,
followed Ray Charles’ song “I Got A Woman” forward
and backwards in an attempt to discover what source
materials went into making the song and how the
song was later allowed to be used.117 Boyle asserted
that it was musicologically common knowledge that
Charles’ song was merely a rewording of the hymn
“Jesus Is All the World to Me,” which was written by
Will Lamartine Thompson and published in 1904.118
Under the copyright law of the time, when Ray
Charles released “I Got A Woman” in 1955, his use of
Thompson’s material would have been justified without
a license because “Jesus Is All the World to Me” would
have been in the public domain.119 Boyle was skeptical
of Thompson’s song actually being the source material
for “I Got A Woman,” because he said there was little
resemblance between the two pieces.120 After tedious
research, Boyle found what he called a “mysterious
song” by the Bailey Gospel Singers entitled “I’ve Got
a Savior,”121 which sounds like “I’ve Got A Woman”
and predates Ray Charles.122 After even more digging,
Boyle found that “I’ve Got a Savior” had roots in
the spiritual “Ain’t That Good News,” from 1940.123
Charles was known for creating re-worded versions of
gospel songs and turning them into rhythm and blues,
so the probability of this progression with “I Got A
Woman” was likely.124 It was probable that “I’ve Got a
Savior” did not properly obtain copyright protection
when it was written, so no matter which song was
Charles’ source material, their respective inhabitance
in the public domain would have allowed him to make
his adaptation of the work.125 Boyle’s main concern
was this: Thompson and Ward were likely to find
Charles’ new work, a mesh of sacred and secular music,
to be unsavory at best.126 Under today’s copyright law,
117. Boyle, supra note 2, at 126.
118. Id. at 127-28.
119. Id. at 128.
120. Id. at 127-28.
121. Id. at 134 (stating that “I’ve Got a Savior” was thought
to be written by famous gospel singer Clara Ward).
122. Id. at 133.
123. Boyle, supra note 2, at 133.
124. Id. at 134. Charles had turned Clara Ward’s “This Little
Light of Mine” into “This Little Girl of Mine.”
125. Id. at 136.
126. Id. at 134.

Charles would have had to obtain a license from either
Thompson or Ward to create his seminal work, and it
would have been at their discretion to refuse Charles
such a license.127 With this intense background for
Ray Charles as “borrower sans-license,” we skip to the
present, where rapper Kanye West released his song
“Gold Digger.”128
West’s song sampled the music composition
copyright of “I Got A Woman,” and West obtained
a license through Charles’ estate, a license the heirs
to Charles’ estate were not required to give.129 Boyle
conducted a Fair Use/de minimis analysis, like the
one illustrated above, to contemplate whether West
needlessly obtained a license.130 Boyle’s analysis leads
to anything but a concrete answer for whether West
should have been able to sample without a license;
therefore, it is safe to say that West’s decision to obtain
a license was conscientious, at least.131 To complicate
matters further, an amateur hip-hop group, Legendary
K.O., digitally sampled West’s song in response to
Hurricane Katrina and West’s thoughts on President
George W. Bush’s actions during the conflict.132 No
licenses were obtained by Legendary K.O.133 The full
circle of this group of creative events is important
because it fully illustrates how people make musical
objects and the interactions between musical motifs,
digital samples, and other musical elements in our
creative culture. This situation is also fodder for the
argument that perhaps musical creation can gain
a level of deference held by scientific research; a
creative dialectic of this magnitude is one of the most
remarkable aspects of our humanity. Now that the
tango danced between music creation and the law has
been displayed, it is worthwhile to explore how similar
systemic values can be found in the creative endeavors
of the Biotech community.
2. The Human Genome Project is Similar to
Ray Charles
In the example above, it was shown that
copyright laws instituted in the latter part of the 20th
century made it more difficult to create musical works
that were created using similar methods earlier in
127. Id. at 156.
128. Id. at 138.
129. Boyle, supra note 2, at 140.
130. Id. at 140-41.
131. Id. at 142.
132. Id. at 142-43.
133. Id. at 157 (stating that Legendary K.O. understood
that Kanye West probably had a legal right to claim that their song
infringed his copyright).
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the century. In the Biotech community, the Human
Genome Project (HGP) also contrasts the use of
material, in this case genetic as opposed to sonic,
in both the public and private sectors. However, in
the example of the HGP explicated below, the battle
between public and private use of material happens
simultaneously instead of sequentially.
The HGP was started in 1990 by the U.S.
Department of Energy and the NIH with public
funds and the goals to “identify all the approximately
20,000-25,000 genes in the human DNA, determine
the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs
that make up human DNA, store this information in
databases, . . . [and] transfer related technologies to
the private sector . . . .”134 In 1998, Celera Genomics
(“Celera”), a research group founded by former NIH
scientist Dr. J. Craig Venter, decided to initiate a
similar project, but using private funds and aiming
to patent specific genes.135 Celera’s approach also
differed from the publicly funded project in that it
only published its data annually, instead of daily, and
it provided its data by way of subscription to academic
and commercial institutions.136 On March 14, 2000,
President Bill Clinton issued a joint statement with
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair which stated that “raw
fundamental data on the human genome, including
the human DNA sequence and its variations, should
be made freely available to scientists everywhere.”137 In
February of 2001, both the public and private efforts
to map the human genome were published in Nature138
and Science,139 respectively. Celera had incorporated
the public data into their genome, but prohibited the
public effort from using Celera data.140
134. Human Genome Project Information, http://www.
ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last
visited Jan. 11, 2011).
135. See Celera, https://www.celera.com/celera/history;
see also Kristen Philipkoski, Celera Wins Genome Race, Wired
(Apr. 6, 2000), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/
news/2000/04/35479.
136. See Kristen Philipkoski, Final Stretch in the Genome Race,
Wired (Oct. 25, 1999), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/
news/1999/10/32076.
137. Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister
Tony Blair of the U.K. (Mar. 14, 2000), http://clinton4.nara.gov/
WH/EOP/OSTP/html/00314.html. This statement curbed Celera’s
attempts to patent specific genes; however, it did not change Celera’s
choice to offer its data via subscription.
138. Eric S. Lander et al., Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the
Human Genome, 409 Nature 860 (2001).
139. J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human
Genome, 291 Science 1304 (2001).
140. Lewis Hyde, Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and
Ownership 191, 196 (2010).
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Celera’s unwillingness to share its data is
analogous to Ray Charles borrowing freely from his
predecessors while asking that new musicians obtain
licenses of his work. In both cases, Ray Charles and
Celera are able to have their cake and eat it too.
Leslie Roberts anticipated this type of situation at the
outset of the HGP in his article, Genome Project:
An Experiment in Sharing, which was published in
the same journal as Celera’s genome results.141 In the
case of the HGP, even Celera realized the hypocrisy
of its ways when, in 2005, they decided to end their
subscription service and place their genome sequence
data in the public GenBank.142 It is true that the HGP
example does not specifically include the use of MTAs
or the UBMTA; however, the significance is that both
the Biotech and music communities similarly suffer
when private entities are allowed to exploit public
information, but not vice versa. Creation, in either
context, functions properly when public information
is privatized in such a totalizing way. This paper does
not bemoan the privatization of information in total, it
only contemplates situations where the proprietization
of information should be handled with more nuance,
especially in situations where similar information is
handled both publicly and privately. With the parallel
solidified, or at least enumerated, between the two
disparate communities we can now explore the ways
in which the music community can learn from the
Biotech world.
B. A Model Sampling License as the Musical
UBMTA
In a complex area of law such as intellectual
property licensing, where many intricate transactions
constantly take place and the industries involved
rely on those transactions taking place quickly and
efficiently, it makes sense for each industry to adopt
some sort of standard practice. The NIH and PHS
clearly recognized the need that existed to streamline
transfers of patented materials between universities for
research and non-commercial purposes. The process
used to create the UBMTA can be replicated in crafting
a model agreement for licensing digital samples.
Just as the NIH proposed the UBMTA,143
it would not be unfathomable for a Model Sampling
License (MSL) to be proposed, in this case, by a
141. Leslie Roberts, Genome Project: An Experiment in
Sharing, 248 Science 953 (1990).
142. Jocelyn Kaiser, Celera to End Subscriptions and Give Data
to Public GenBank, 308 Science 775 (2005).
143. See Part I(A)(i), supra.
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national think tank responsible for monitoring these
types of issues, such as Future of Music Coalition,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, or the Center for
Social Media at American University’s Washington
College of Law. If the necessary credence for
such a policy proposal must come from a federal
administrative agency, it seems most likely that the
United States Copyright Office could provide guidance
to Congress on such an issue. After a period of public
comment, a document could be crafted by the original
third party policy proposer that properly balances
the Constitutional requirements of copyright and the
contemporary realities of the marketplace.
Just as the UBMTA was insufficient for all
transactions, the MSL would not be a one size fits
all answer to sampling licenses. In this context, the
concern is amplified because the number of musicians
that exist, only counting musicians who utilize digital
samples, dwarfs the number of university level scientific
researchers. The MSL could be in a tiered system
depending on different levels of use that the licensee
is willing to abide by.144 The tiers could correlate to
different levels of freedom associated with each license,
similar to Creative Commons (CC) licenses which
allow for the licensors to control the level of restriction
for each particular license it offers.145 Major record
labels have not adopted CC; this is likely because most
content creators do not believe that CC engenders
fiscally viable interactions between licensors and
licensees.146 An MSL would change that because it
would set up a dialogue between licensees interested
in procuring a non-commercial license, which has
the propensity for commercial use in the future,
with licensors vying to enhance the value of their
copyrighted works. In this way, the MSL would mimic
the UBMTA. Bavarian Nordic v. Acambis Inc. is an
144. This could allay some fears of the record labels that are
licensing content. One of the concerns is that there would be no
control of uses as either commercial or non-commercial because
of how digital music can move around the internet. However, this
ignores the changing economic principles of the music industry as
they apply to the internet. See Jared S. Walsh, Pay What You Like No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should Make Digital Music Free For
Non-Commercial Uses, 58 Emory L.J. 1495 (2009).
145. See Creative Commons, www.creativecommons.
org/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (Creative Commons is a
licensing system that parallels standard copyright law. CC allows its
users to mark their digital material with a license that explains what
rights the license holder has allowed the public to engage in with
their work).
146. At least in the literary world, this is strange because
writers like Lawrence Lessig and Cory Doctorow have been
extremely successful giving away their books for free under CC
licenses online.

example of a case where a licensor lost potential future
commercial ventures with his material because he
unwittingly transferred material using an unrestricted
MTA.147 If the parties in Bavarian Nordic took part
in the UBMTA, then 1) the use of the material would
have been restricted to non-commercial, and 2) the
stage would have been set for those non-commercial
uses to be renegotiated into commercial uses. With
no current model agreement available for use with
digital samples, there is no good way for individuals
to successfully make sure that instances like Bavarian
Nordic do not happen to them. The MSL will borrow
directly from the UBMTA to avoid scenarios like
Bavarian Nordic.
In terms of borrowing terms directly from
the UBMTA, there are specific provisions that it
would benefit the MSL to appropriate. First, the MSL
should have a similar structure related to allocation of
ownership as the UBMTA. In the MSL, the Provider
would be the content provider and the Material
would be the digital sample. The Provider would
retain ownership of the digital sample and any trace
of the digital sample which exists in modifications,
which were not Fair Use or de minimis, made by the
Recipient musician. The use of the Fair Use and de
minimis doctrines would mimic the ownership clause
in the UBMTA where the Recipient retains ownership
of works that no longer contain any original material,
progeny, or unmodified derivatives.148
The base level MSL could include use
provisions similar to those of the UBMTA, namely that
the Recipient would use the digital sample solely for
“teaching and academic research purposes.”149 Again,
this may seem like a provision that cannot be blindly
taken from the Biotech context and thrown into the
den of musical wolves. However, as the lengthy study
above showed, what is being conducted here by the
147. 486 F. Supp. 2d 354, 364 (D. Del. 2007). It is unclear
whether Plaintiff in the case actually had ownership of said material,
but for purposes of this paper it can be assumed that he did.
148. It may be difficult to draw an exact line where the
Provider’s original sample no longer exists in the Recipient’s new
musical work. However, it is reasonable to believe that there is a
qualifiable level wherein the sample has been so far modified that
it is unrecognizable from its original form. See Shamantis, Justin
Beiber: 800% Slower, YouTube (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=QspuCt1FM9M.
149. Currently, there is no specific field of “Academic
Research” sampling in music. There is sampling that happens in
the academic context, but similar sampling also takes place in the
amateur context. In this case, the “Academic Research” clause of the
UBMTA would be interpreted as allowing non-commercial use with
a properly executed MSL.
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music creators is cultural research of mass import. This
cultural research leads to dissemination of important
criticism and critique from the populous, something
that should not be relegated to academic institutions in
this case. Further, digital samples are fantastic teaching
tools for imparting onto the younger generation the
skills of technology. Just as individuals learned to write
words and then paint pictures, children will learn how
to code and manipulate digital samples. However, this
is where the MSL could deviate from the UBMTA by
having different tiers of use in an attempt to deal with
the much larger magnitude of potential users of digital
samples.
The MSL will also contain the provision from
the UBMTA dealing with the commercialization of
the digital sample or modifications of such. This clause
is another vehicle for the MSL to encourage dialog
between the licensor and the licensee about creating
viable economic opportunities for both parties where
none existed before. As the market continues to change
from what the record labels were used to in the past 30
years, such a boon from this sort of licensing, perhaps a
pittance before, will look infinitely more attractive.
Another delicate area of transference from
the UBMTA to the MSL will be in the publication
provision. Most music created with digital samples,
even if completely non-commercial, is meant for
publication primarily, if not solely, on the internet.
This type of “user generated content,” is one of the fires
that burn most brightly for the population of potential
Recipients to the MSL agreement.150 However, another
level of the tier structure could delineate different levels
of publication allowed for such a license.
Finally, it will be important that, for at least
the base level MSL, the transfer of the digital sample
to the Recipient is free, minus transaction costs. The
transaction cost here could even be the price of the
song itself, assuring that from now on individuals must
purchase the material that they are interested in using
to create derivative works.
C. The Actual Hope for a MSL
There is actual hope for this type of endeavor
to take hold in the music industry and community.
Arts communities have been trying to deal with the
dearth of model agreements which could help different
mediums create their work without legal red tape. The
Center for Social Media (CSM) in Washington, DC
has been spearheading efforts for what it calls “Best
150. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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Practices in Fair Use.”151 The CSM first dealt with the
medium of documentary filmmakers to deal with the
type of problem that we encountered in section II(A)
(ii) of this paper. The process that the CSM and the
community of documentary filmmakers went through
to create a model agreement that both creators and
corporations could agree on resembled the process
needed to create the UBMTA. Obviously, as has been
shown above, music presents its own unique problems
for Fair Use and licensing. The attempt for a “Best
Practices in Fair Use for Music Sampling,” again
organized by CSM, but this time partnering with the
Future of Music Coalition,152 would be an amazing
collaboration which could facilitate either an MSL, or
a “Best Practices,” that would have an equivalent effect.
I implore both organizations to think deeply about
pursuing such an endeavor.
The first definitive text on law and digital
sampling, Creative License: The Law and Culture of
Digital Sampling by Kembrew McLeod and Peter
DiCola, was released March 2011.153 The book analyzes
specific examples of seminal albums featuring digital
samples, such as Public Enemey’s Fear of a Black
Planet and Beastie Boys’ Paul’s Boutique, which could
no longer be made today without some type of legal
reform.154 The book offers suggestions for reform in
this area, such as enhanced property rights, compulsory
licenses, specific definitons for de minimis at Fair Use,
and new voluntary licenses.155 The reforms proposed
by the book vary from moderate to quite radical, such
as the proposal that copyright holders affirmatively,
and with accompanying payment, opt-out of the
public’s ability to sample its work.156 However, DiCola
and McLeod’s work did not rally the troops around
copyright reform, in this area.157 To underscore the
151. See Center for Social Media, Best Practices,
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/best-practices (last
visited January 11, 2011). A “Best Practices in Fair Use” creates an
agreement between the industry and the creators on what will be
considered Fair Use. Therefore, for example, creators do not have
to guess whether their appropriation of a scene from an industry
created film will get them wrapped into litigation. The bounds of
Fair Use are set and followed without court intervention.
152. For more information on the Future of Music Coalition
visit www.futureofmusic.org.
153. DiCola & McLeod, supra, note 67.
154. Id. at 207-57.
155. Id. at 217.
156. Id. at 263.
157. During Future of Music Coalition’s 2010 Policy Summit,
the Center for Social Media handed out fliers for “Best Practices in
Fair Use for Music Sampling.” No information was ever put online
for the project, and, a year and a half later, the project has not come
to fruition. Even after the publication of Creative License, a formal

Spring 2012

academic nature of the book, the proposal mentioned
above was offered as a “thought experiment,” not
necessarily something with practical application.158
This is not to denigrate the great accomplishments of
Creative License; however, the MSL can pick up where
the text leaves off.
Decisively, a sea change has already started
to occur, and the more opportunities there are for
equitable and profitable licensing available for creators
and corporations to choose from, the smoother, and
hopefully more pro-creativity, the transition will be.
IV. Conclusion
This paper compared the similarities that
exist in the creation of patentable objects and the
creation of copyrightable objects; more specifically, the
similarities between the creation of Biotech materials
and musical materials. In making that comparison,
this paper showed that a particular licensing technique
utilized by the Biotech community, the UBMTA, holds
helpful tips for model agreements that could be used
in the music industry for licensing digital samples.
Whether the creative pursuit at issue hinges on the
use of DNA or quarter notes, we are intrinsically,
and constitutionally, motivated to make sure that the
public benefits from our need to continually push the
envelope. The current copyright licensing structure
does not support new, valid, and important mediums
of expression which will suffer, and perhaps even die, if
new means of legally transferring intellectual property
are not vigorously pursued.

attempt to reform laws around digital sampling, either by legislation
or industry practice, has not been put forward.
158. DiCola & McLeod, supra note 67.
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